


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The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

Von Gar Alperovitz

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Von Gar Alperovitz : The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb:

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen1 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Second-Guessing HistoryVon Ein KundeSecond-guessing history is always a dicey business, full of "what-ifs" and wild

speculation. However, as Alperovitz makes clear, there were several viable options to ending the Pacific War that were both more humane and likely to succeed. 1. Demonstrate the Atom Bomb on an uninhabited atoll, as recommended in the Franck Report by a committee of scientists working on the Project 2. Make a small concession to Japanese pride/saving face and allow the Emperor to retain his throne in a total, but conditional, surrender (which they had already proposed) 3. Allow a few extra days for Japan to react to the entry of the Soviets into the war. It is now known that overtures to a settlement had been relayed to the British Foreign Minister. Any one of these options would be more likely to succeed than a full-fledged armed invasion of the home islands, which had been proposed as a military disinformation but wasn't being seriously considered. As such, it backfired horribly by strengthening Japanese resolve. Instead, the hawks and, for lack of a better term, "military-minded" advisors to new president Truman recommended a full use of the weapon. As a result, the United States is still the only nation on earth to have used Atomic weapons in war -- twice -- and against unarmed civilians. Not a very proud legacy. Their reasoning, with the hindsight of fifty years, now seems sadly small-minded: 1. To justify the expenditure of \$2 billion on a weapon originally designed in competition with the now-defeated Germany 2. To intimidate the Soviets into accepting American hegemony. Experience bore out the Franck Report's prediction that the second goal was unattainable, and its further prediction that a ruinous nuclear arms race would result. The recommendations and predictions of some of the world's smartest people were thrown out by military advisors (specifically James Byrnes, who refused to even share the report with Truman), considering himself better equipped to understand human nature and thus shape history for all of mankind. Whether "revisionist" or second-guessing, Alperovitz makes a compelling case for better options dismissed, and the tragic legacy of military hubris.

1 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. This guy did his homework Von Ein Kunde Of the many books that are on the subject of the atomic bomb, this one to date is the most insightful i have read. This book will make you think about the american situation at the end of WWII. Not only what is at stake, but the options to Truman at the time are covered. It might surprise you that the last thing that was on the american leaders' mind was an invasion on Japan minor scheduled for spring 1946. Fact is that they were close to surrender already and knew the end was near. The book will take you through hundreds of documents backing up what i just wrote. The actual dropping of the bomb is just history....why did we choose to drop it is the real question. These are the hardest questions to answer but need to be approached if we are to ever apply it in a world I feel is more unstable now than ever. The decision in 1946 affects us even today. Read this book.

1 von 6 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. A revisionist's view of the decision to use atomic weapons Von Ein Kunde The book attempts, unsuccessfully, to show that the United States did not need to use atomic weapons against Japan. While this is true and an invasion was in the works (Operation DOWNFALL composed of two parts: OLYMPIC and CORONET), that invasion would have been much more costly: MacArthur's staff had predicted ca. 125,000 KIA/MIA/WIA for Allied forces by X-day plus 120. That is just Allied casualties. To get an idea of Japanese losses, look at the kill ratio from 03/01/44 to 05/01/45: 310,000 Japanese to 14,000 U.S., a ratio of 22:1; for all casualties (KIA/WIA/MIA) this ratio is 5:1. This gives ca. 625,000 Japanese casualties (KIA/WIA/MIA) by X-day plus 120. These figures are for OLYMPIC only; had CORONET been launched at the Tokyo Plain in 1946, who knows. A much better book on the subject, a scholarly approach to history, is The Invasion of Japaan by John Ray Skates. The decision to drop the bombs really started at Pearl Harbor on 12/07/41 and was sealed by the suicidal defense of Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa coupled with the U.S. insistence on unconditional surrender, the same surrender we insisted Germany adhere to. The use of atomic weapons was a direct result of the actions taken by Japan on December 7, 1941.

Kurzbeschreibung Controversial in nature, this book demonstrates that the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb against Japan. Alperovitz criticizes one of the most hotly debated precursory events to the Cold War, an event that was largely responsible for the evolution of post-World War II American politics and culture. From the Trade Paperback edition. From Booklist Alperovitz is the dean of revisionist scholars who argue that the nuclear bombing of Japan was unnecessary and that America bears a hefty responsibility for the cold war. Since he established his reputation in the mid-1960s, secret documents regarding the run-up to Enola Gay's takeoff have come to light, which Alperovitz believes strengthen his case. His main and probably most controversial contention is that certain documents pertaining to the decision were doctored, some by none other than Truman himself. Further, Alperovitz sees James Byrnes, Truman's Mephistophelian secretary of state, as a furtive player who nixed such alternative plans as modifying the unconditional-surrender demand and encouraging a Russian declaration of war. What about the military leaders, many of whom expressed regrets about the wisdom of the decision, albeit post facto? Alperovitz presents documents that suggest their invasion plans were notional exercises, not realistic probabilities. But his point about their regrets opens the way to his major thesis: deceit by ex-officials, over the decades, has convinced the public that the bombings were justified. Formidably researched, this challenging landmark history may not automatically convert Alperovitz's revisionist views into the new orthodoxy, but they will be referred to for proof or refutation for years to come. Gilbert Taylor From Library Journal The president of the National Center for Economic Alternatives argues that against all

advice President Truman was persuaded to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima by incoming Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who saw the bomb as an important tool for dealing with the Soviets after the war. Copyright 1995 Reed Business Information, Inc.