


(Download ebook) The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia

The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia

Von Donald W. Hamilton

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Von Donald W. Hamilton : The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia:

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Art of InsurgencyVon a.s.d.Splendid work!! I recommend this book to all interested in not only military history and the Vietnam war, but those particularly interested in understanding what the world is facing today. Hamilton's research is truly marvelous, and his insights into the recent past reflect important notions into contemporary issues faced by the U.S. military today, particularly regarding terrorism and the inner-workings of insurgent organizations. This is an important book that should be read by all involved in policy making, and at the highest levels.

KurzbeschreibungIn his analysis of insurgency war, Donald Hamilton first attempts to provide insight into a strategic concept he believes is little understood today, and to explain its complicated relationship to American policy failures in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 era of containment. The study develops a working model of insurgency, explaining it as both a unique method and type of war-making. Significant findings include the inability of policymakers to perceive a potential insurgency in Vietnam as early as 1946, subsequent American involvement in not one, but three Asian insurgencies during the 1950s, and the ultimate failure of the U.S. military to meet the insurgency challenge in South Vietnam. This inability to eliminate the insurgency led not only to the complete breakdown of the South Vietnamese government, but was the primary reason why further U.S. military action after 1965 would prove ineffectual. This historical narrative also follows the involvement of several key players, including the personalities of Edward Lansdale, Sir Robert Thompson, Archimedes Patti, and Vo Nguyen Giap, who through their life experiences and writings, provide a keen profundity into why insurgencies occur, why they fail, and why they succeed.

Pressestimmen"A well-researched look into why insurgencies occur, why they sometimes fail, and why more often seem to succeed."-Sea Power?A well-researched look into why insurgencies occur, why they sometimes fail, and why more often seem to succeed.?-Sea Power"In noteworthy fashion, Hamilton discusses insurgency as a "method" and as a "type" of warfare. His analysis is clearly superior to anything yet written. I have been studying the Viet Nam conflict for 22 years. Without any reservations, I believe this to be the best book I have yet seen on this subject, and I have read most of them."-from the Foreword by Cecil B. Currey, University of South Florida and award-winning author of Victory at Any Cost

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