


(Free pdf) Technology and the Law on the Use of Force: New Security Challenges in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge Research in International Law)

Technology and the Law on the Use of Force: New Security Challenges in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge Research in International Law)

Von Jackson Maogoto

*ebooks | Download PDF | *ePub | DOC | audiobook*



DOWNLOAD



READ ONLINE

Produktinformation Veröffentlicht am: 2014-11-13Erscheinungsdatum: 2014-11-13File Name: B00PK5JTE8
| File size: 38.Mb

Von Jackson Maogoto : Technology and the Law on the Use of Force: New Security Challenges in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge Research in International Law) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Technology and the Law on the Use of Force: New Security Challenges in

the Twenty-First Century (Routledge Research in International Law):

Kundenrezensionen
Hilfreichste Kundenrezensionen
0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich.
Advances
Von Phillip Taylor MBE
WHILE THE TECHNOLOGY OF CONFLICT ADVANCES, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FAILS TO KEEP UP
An appreciation by Phillip Taylor MBE and Elizabeth Taylor of Richmond Green Chambers
Of interest primarily to international lawyers, this new publication from Routledge offers a fascinating legal perspective on the problems, not to mention the catastrophes wrought by modern warfare in all its forms, from military (involving high-tech weaponry designed to kill) to digital warfare encompassing a diversity of cyber-attacks. The latter -- while not directly causing loss of life -- generates its own form of havoc, by disabling or destroying electronic systems, thereby cutting off vital lines of communication. Actually a monograph, the book's perspective is global, extending indeed into outer space. The author, Jackson Maogoto, a senior lecturer at the University of Manchester, undertook much of his research during his sabbatical with the British Institute for International and Comparative Law (BIICL). Without wishing to appear melodramatic, he says, the prospect of a celestial war can no longer be regarded as mere fantasy. His extensive research amply supports this alarming prognostication. He mentions -- to quote just one example -- the 2001 Commission chaired by the then US Secretary of State which called for governmental investment in developing superior space capabilities, concluding that space warfare is, or will be, a virtual certainty. For further discussion on this subject, check out Chapter 3 entitled The Fourth Domain: ascendance of outer space as a war theatre. What is referred to as the fifth domain is explained in the chapter on cyber-war and expanded upon in the final chapter on Old legal frameworks for new threats. Technology has advanced, observes the author, but the legal framework has failed to adapt, rendering states unable to legally defend themselves effectively. Now there's an argument that lamentably, seems unarguable -- which gives rise to a discussion of another key issue: self-defence and the right of states to respond. Here, the role of the United Nations in international conflict of whatever kind, (past, present and future) is considered throughout. Academics and students, as well as comparative lawyers will welcome this author's thorough approach to a quite thorny, and certainly topical, subject and with a bibliography of no less than nineteen pages, plus useful tables of cases and statutes, the book is an excellent research resource. The publication date is cited as at 2015.

Kurzbeschreibung
As governmental and non-governmental operations become progressively supported by vast automated systems and electronic data flows, attacks of government information infrastructure, operations and processes pose a serious threat to economic and military interests. In 2007 Estonia suffered a month long cyber assault to its digital infrastructure, described in cyberspace as Web War I. In 2010, a worm Stuxnet was identified as supervisory control and data acquisition systems at Iran's uranium enrichment plant, presumably in an attempt to set back Iran's nuclear programme. The dependence upon telecommunications and information infrastructures puts at risk Critical National Infrastructure, and is now at the core of national security interests. This book takes a detailed look at these new theatres of war and considers their relation to international law on the use of force. Except in cases of self-defence or with the authorisation of a Security Council Resolution, the use of force is prohibited under the UN charter and customary international law. However, the law of jus ad bellum was developed in a pre-digital era where current technological capabilities could not be conceived. Jackson Maogoto asks whether the law on the use of force is able to deal with legal disputes likely to arise from modern warfare. Key queries include how one defines an armed attack in an age of anti-satellite weaponry, whether the destruction of a State's vital digital eco-system or the "blinding" of military communication satellites constitutes a threat, and how one delimits the threshold that would enliven the right of self-defence or retaliatory action. The book argues that while technology has leapt ahead, the legal framework has failed to adapt, rendering States unable to legally defend themselves effectively. The book will be of great interest and use to researchers and students of international law, the law of armed conflict, Information Technology and the law, and counter-terrorism.
Kurzbeschreibung
As governmental and non-governmental operations become progressively supported by vast automated systems and electronic data flows, attacks of government information infrastructure, operations and processes pose a serious threat to economic and military interests. In 2007 Estonia suffered a month long cyber assault to its digital infrastructure, described in cyberspace as Web War I. In 2010, a worm Stuxnet was identified as supervisory control and data acquisition systems at Iran's uranium enrichment plant, presumably in an attempt to set back Iran's nuclear programme. The dependence upon telecommunications and information infrastructures puts at risk Critical National Infrastructure, and is now at the core of national security interests. This book takes a detailed look at these new theatres of war and considers their relation to international law on the use of force. Except in cases of self-defence or with the authorisation of a Security Council Resolution, the use of force is prohibited under the UN charter and customary international law. However, the law of jus ad bellum was developed in a pre-digital era where current technological capabilities could not be conceived. Jackson Maogoto asks whether the law on the use of force is able to deal with legal disputes likely to arise from modern warfare. Key queries include how

one defines an armed attack in an age of anti-satellite weaponry, whether the destruction of a States vital digital ecosystem or the "blinding" of military communication satellites constitutes a threat, and how one delimits the threshold that would enliven the right of self-defence or retaliatory action. The book argues that while technology has leapt ahead, the legal framework has failed to adapt, rendering States unable to legally defend themselves effectively. The book will be of great interest and use to researchers and students of international law, the law of armed conflict, Information Technology and the law, and counter-terrorism. ber den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende Jackson Maogoto is Senior Lecturer at the University of Manchester, UK.