


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## On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War

Von Harry G. Summers

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Von Harry G. Summers : On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War:

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen1 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Five Stars for Colonel SummersVon Stephen Thurston (sthurston@earthlink.net)One of the enduring ironies of military

history--and the history of military thought--is that the most profound analysis, clearest insights, and most enduring illumination of the principles and practice of warfare has been accomplished by military professionals of relatively modest rank. To the distinguished list of Colonel Clausewitz, Captain Mahan, and Captain Hart, add Colonel Harry Summers. ON STRATEGY is certainly the most important book on military theory to appear since WWII and is perhaps the most important work of this century. Potential purchasers need have no fear that this book will be out-of-print for the foreseeable future; the presses will keep running because ON STRATEGY will be required reading in every military academy in the world for many decades. ON STRATEGY is "about" the Vietnam War in much the same way that Clausewitz is "about" the Napoleonic Wars or that Mahan is "about" 18th-century naval struggles between France and England. That is, Summers uses the Vietnam War as a vehicle for analysis and illustration of principles of war that apply universally. Aside from the clarity of his thought, Summers' most remarkable achievement is his writing style: For all of its subtlety, this book is accessible and valuable for readers who may have little background in military affairs. At the end of WW II, the United States created special five-star ranks to honor its most senior commanders for their contributions to victory. A book review is a poor substitute for a richly-deserved star to reward extraordinary service to the nation. But for his brilliant analysis and articulate writing, pin Five Stars on Harry Summers' collar. - - - - - The reviewer is a former military intelligence analyst. 0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Back off the praise a bit Von Ein Kunde The most appropriate review of this book isn't one I could ever write; rather, it came from two notable authors on counter-guerrilla warfare. As I recall, David Hackworth in About Face calls into question Summer's assertion of we-won-all-the-battles-but-lost-the-wars quote from NV general. But Robert Asprey, author of a simply wonderful survey of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla techniques over the years, said the book "as nearly as I can figure out, suggest all would have gone well in Vietnam if there had been no guerrillas and Karl von Clausewitz had been in command ... There is still much to learn and much to explain. So long as Western governments fail to work with less democratically minded governments in trying to eradicate in whole or in part the basic reasons for regional insurgencies, these will continue to burst forth." Until American doctrine moves further away from seeing foreign military-political problems as needing the solution of just domestic political and military with foreign military reaction, more failures are sure to be seen. Too often the country in question needs a more political than military solution, requiring a viable, sensible, caring, representative government. No purely military strategy can fill the gaps. 0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Reply to the "reader from Griffin, Georgia" Von Dex Randall Howard I agree that solving the problems underlying insurgencies is better than resorting to force alone. That said, the Vietnamese insurgents, i.e. the VC, were largely dead following Tet, 1968. The main opponent for the remainder of the war was the NVA regular. The 1972 Easter Offensive and the 1975 offensive leading to Saigon's fall were conducted by conventional NVA military forces crossing the borders. American military assistance defeated the Easter Offensive. We'll never know if the same could have been said about the 1975 campaign. Returning to the underlying conditions. I believe North Vietnam intended to unify the country. It was only a question of when. Could the Saigon government develop the support of the people to prevent this? Apparently not in the time that they had to do it. I believe that maintaining a friendly government in Saigon meant maintaining a friendly government in Hanoi. We would not accept the Hanoi government, so the only way of achieving a friendly government in Vietnam would have required defeating, occupying, and "engineering" North Vietnam. As we did in Japan. I think we had capability, but I do not think we had the will. Perhaps rightly so. Would it have been worth the candle?

**Kurzbeschreibung** Summer's inspired analysis of America's war in Vietnam answers the most pressing questions remaining from that terrible conflict more than a decade before Robert McNamara's painful admissions. **Kurzbeschreibung** Summer's inspired analysis of America's war in Vietnam answers the most pressing questions remaining from that terrible conflict more than a decade before Robert McNamara's painful admissions. **Synopsis** Examines our failures in Vietnam through an analysis of fighting techniques, strategy, and basic principles of war, and discusses subjects including our failure to learn from the Korean experience.