


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No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (English Edition)

Von Larry Berman

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Von Larry Berman : No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (English Edition) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (English Edition):

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen1 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. The Wide Gap Between Spin and Private CalculationsVon Donald MitchellFew readers will fail to be moved by this book,

in most cases seeing it as a vindication of their position about the Vietnam War. For hawks, the book makes a case for greater bombing by B-52s and being a stouter ally for South Vietnam. For doves, the book makes a case for lots of loss for little gain during the Johnson and Nixon years. For those who think the diplomacy was cynical, Dr. Kissinger looks quite slippery. For those who think we took the principled route, there was an opportunity to enforce the peace accords with massive bombing that Watergate eliminated. The book's key strength is that it includes lots of previously classified notes of private meetings made by both the North Vietnamese and the American negotiators. Assembled into a chronological story of how the peace accords were reached, you see a reasonably coherent picture of what was going on in public and behind the scenes at the same time. Anyone who cares to better understand the U.S. experience in Vietnam will find this book to add valuable understanding. The spin is separated from the reality. I think most people will be more than a little shocked to realize how wide the cynicism was that led people to work on public relations and politics at the expense of solving the problem, however you define it. Foreign governments were trying to influence American election results. The U.S. was trying to influence election results in South Vietnam. "Peace with honor" was proclaimed by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger at a time when they did not expect peace, and felt that the honor still had to be earned by massive future bombing. For the North Vietnamese, negotiations and politics were simply tools to help achieve the military victory. If talking could get a bombing pause, a reduction in American troops, or any other concession, that was great. But, they weren't going to give in on achieving the ultimate victory. To assume that they would is like assuming that the American North would have gotten tired of the Civil War and let the South go away at some point. What the book makes painfully clear is that the United States treated the South Vietnamese government (which we often praised in public) as unimportant to American interests whenever a decision had to be made. When it came to the negotiations, the South Vietnamese were rarely consulted . . . and often not even informed until long after the fact. For example, it was pretty clear that unless the North Vietnamese troops were pulled out that South Vietnam would eventually lose. It appears that no one tried very hard to get them out. By 1970, the U.S. gave up on that key point in negotiations. Many years later, former president Nixon admitted this was a large blunder. Surely, he knew it at the time, as did the Secretary of State. The South Vietnamese leaders raised the point endlessly and accurately. As interesting as this book is, I graded it down for reading too much into the details it describes. For instance, Dr. Kissinger is described as never telling any two parties the same story during the negotiations. In my experience in observing negotiators, that is not unusual in trying to bring people closer together when they are far apart. By seeing only his words, we don't know what was going on in his mind. There may have been perfectly valid strategies that could have worked, but didn't that are not revealed here. Also, the book argues that the administration felt that it could credibly rely on a large, long-term bombing campaign after the peace accords. That's pretty unlikely. In the last offensive on North Vietnam, the SAMs knocked down 15 B-52s. In any long-term bombing, every one of them would have been lost within months. I'm sure all the Americans understood that. Massive, long-term bombing with few losses was not an option. The other reason I graded the book down is that it argues too much from a perspective of hindsight. Negotiations in 1954 had led to a relatively fine temporary solution in Vietnam. The Korean War had ground to a halt in much the same way. There were few reasons for the Nixon administration to assume that a similar deal could not be brokered again with the major powers. Most reasonable people would probably agree that it was worth at least two years of negotiations before getting the message that the end wasn't going to be pretty. Some people might have handed South Vietnam over to the North sooner, but they didn't have the chance so we don't know what would have happened if Senator McGovern had been elected. Clearly, most people in the American leadership misunderstood from the beginning what was going on with the North Vietnamese. That was always the real problem. After you learn from reading this book, I suggest that you think about where else our foreign policy assumptions could be mistaken today. What does it mean to negotiate with our former foes and our former friends? Probably different things from what we think it means. Consider Japan. What are our national goals? It's hard to tell beyond opening up exports to Japan. Get fully acquainted with the people you're negotiating with before deciding on what your objectives should be.

Kurzbeschreibung In 1973, Henry Kissinger shared the Nobel Peace Prize for the secret negotiations that led to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. Nixon famously declared the 1973 agreement to be "peace with honor"; America was disengaging, yet South Vietnam still stood to fight its own war. Kissinger promptly moved to seal up his personal records of the negotiations, arguing that they are private, not government, records, and that he will only allow them to be unsealed after his death. *No Peace, No Honor* deploys extraordinary documentary bombshells, including a complete North Vietnamese account of the secret talks, to blow the lid off the true story of the peace process. Neither Nixon and Kissinger's critics, nor their defenders, have guessed at the full truth: the entire peace negotiation was a sham. Nixon did not plan to exit Vietnam, but he knew that in order to continue bombing without a congressional cutoff, he would need a fig leaf. Kissinger negotiated a deal that he and Nixon expected the North to violate. Ironically, their long-maintained spin on what happened next is partially true: only Watergate stopped

America from sending the bombers back in. This revelatory book has many other surprises. Berman produces new evidence that finally proves a long-suspected connection between candidate Nixon in 1968 and the South Vietnamese government. He tells the full story of Operation Duck Hook, a large-scale offensive planned by Nixon as early as 1969 that would have widened the war even to the point of bombing civilian food supplies. He reveals transcripts of candidate George McGovern's attempts to negotiate his own October surprise for 1972, and a seriocomic plan by the CIA to overthrow South Vietnam's President Thieu even as late as 1975. Throughout, with page-turning dialogue provided by official transcriptions and notes, Berman reveals the step-by-step betrayal of South Vietnam that started with a short-circuited negotiations loop, and ended with double-talk, false promises, and outright abandonment. Berman draws on hundreds of declassified documents, including the notes of Kissinger's aides, phone taps of the Nixon campaign in 1968, and McGovern's own transcripts of his negotiations with North Vietnam. He has been able to double- and triple-check North Vietnamese accounts against American notes of meetings, as well as previously released bits of the record. He has interviewed many key players, including high-level South Vietnamese officials. This definitive account forever and completely rewrites the final chapter of the Vietnam war. Henry Kissinger's Nobel Prize was won at the cost of America's honor. From Publishers Weekly Henry Kissinger shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho for brokering the peace treaty that ended American participation in the Vietnam War in January of that year. Le Duc Tho declined the prize. Berman's eye-opening book makes a strong case although he does not say so that Kissinger should have turned down the prize as well. Making perceptive use of a large cache of recently declassified American and Vietnamese documents, Berman (of the University of California's Washington, D.C., Center) paints a decidedly negative picture of Kissinger's motives and machinations during the four years he negotiated with the North Vietnamese. Kissinger, Berman writes, "was willing to tell one side one thing and the other the opposite, leaving them to sort things out later." Berman's pioneering research indicates also that President Richard Nixon claimed he achieved "peace with honor" while knowing full well that the terms he agreed to would lead eventually to a North Vietnamese military victory following America's withdrawal. Berman also shows that the North Vietnamese were far from blameless during the negotiating. Their leaders regularly deceived the American negotiators and never planned to live up to the peace terms they signed. Surprisingly, the one group of leaders that comes out relatively unscathed is the notoriously corrupt South Vietnamese regime headed by Nguyen Van Thieu, which wound up agreeing to peace terms dictated by North Vietnam and the United States terms that all but ordained South Vietnam's eventual fall to the Communists in April 1975. (Aug.) Forecast: With Christopher Hitchens's *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* and other books critical of the former secretary of state beginning to crowd the shelves, look for pundits to brandish this carefully argued monograph. Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information, Inc. From Booklist When the Paris Peace Talks, which began in 1968, ended with the signing of an agreement to end the war in Vietnam, President Nixon told the American people he had brought them "peace with honor." Although the accord ended most of the American military involvement in Vietnam, it did not bring peace to the Vietnamese people. Relying on newly released documents and North Vietnamese transcripts, Berman reveals that Nixon and Kissinger would ultimately agree to disengagement of the U.S. at almost any price. Two years later, Saigon fell to North Vietnam, with a remaining contingent of Americans making a chaotic exit off the roof of the U.S. embassy. Berman reveals that during Nixon's run for the White House, he tried to stall the talks until he became president. These revelations and others underscore the author's beliefs that the U.S. sold out one of its allies, sacrificed the lives of more than 58,000 Americans in a losing cause, and left the credibility of the U.S. government at home and around the world in tatters. Marlene Chamberlain Copyright American Library Association. All rights reserved